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We examine the possibility of device-independent relativistic quantum bit commitment. We
note the potential threat of location attacks, in which the behaviour of untrusted devices used in
relativistic quantum cryptography depends on their space-time location. We describe relativistic
quantum bit commitment schemes that are immune to these attacks, and show that these schemes
offer device-independent security against hypothetical post-quantum adversaries subject only to the
no-signalling principle. We compare a relativistic classical bit commitment scheme with similar
features, and note some possible advantages of the quantum schemes.
Introduction
This paper explores the scope for device-independent relativistic quantum cryptographic protocols, focussing on
the case of relativistic quantum bit commitment. There have been considerable advances lately in both relativistic
quantum cryptography [8–28] and device-independent quantum cryptography [29–46]. This motivates our investiga-
tion of device-independent relativistic protocols. Such protocols are not only potentially practically useful but also
theoretically interesting, because they add to our understanding of the relationship between quantum nonlocality,
cryptographic security and the no-signalling principle. For example, asking whether certain correlations are “suf-
ficiently nonlocal” to implement a given task securely suggests useful measures of nonlocality. Determining which
tasks can be implemented using quantum or no-signalling resources is also a path to understanding the properties of
relativistic quantum information [11].
For tasks such as bit commitment, which involve two mistrustful parties, device-independent protocols aim to guar-
antee security to both parties even when neither of them trusts the quantum devices used. Fully device-independent
protocols make no assumption whatsoever about the mechanisms of the devices used, except that (a) they are con-
strained by known physical laws, (b) they can be contained within secure laboratories, whose resident cryptographer
controls all inward and outward information flows. Thus both parties must allow for the possibility that any quantum
devices they use may have been designed by the other party, who may maliciously have included hidden features
designed to give the appearance of normal functioning while actually compromising security.
One point we think particularly worth highlighting is that requiring full device-independence is an even stronger
constraint in relativistic quantum cryptography than in standard quantum cryptography. Relativistic cryptographic
protocols require specific configurations of agents and devices in space-time, arranged to ensure that the agents cannot
exchange data during the protocol (or critical parts thereof). Thus if two separated agents are using devices that are
supposed to produce appropriately correlated outputs, they may be unable to check this behaviour during critical parts
of the protocol. Even if they perform tests of the devices before the protocol, they remain vulnerable to space-time
location attacks. That is, devices that are able to track their own space and time coordinates may be programmed to
reproduce the expected behaviour when they are originally tested but not when they are implementing a critical part
of the protocol at specified space-time locations. For example, if a particularly critical bit commitment is going to be
initiated at noon GMT by devices in Cambridge and Auckland, one of Alice’s devices might be programmed so that
it usually behaves as Alice expects but, if and only if it is in Cambridge at noon, it gives her an output that should
encrypt her committed bit but actually immediately reveals it to Bob’s Cambridge agent. These attacks are potentially
problematic, because they defeat some testing strategies that work well in non-relativistic device-independent quantum
cryptography. Nonetheless, the protocols we describe resist them.
From the practical point of view, one would also like to understand whether device-independent relativistic quantum
bit commitment protocols have any advantage over relativistic classical bit commitment protocols. Device-independent
protocols aim to ensure security despite a lack of trust in quantum devices, but still require trusted classical computing,
storage and communication devices. Classical bit commitment protocols also require trusted classical devices, but
require no quantum devices. It is well known that there are unconditionally secure classical relativistic bit commitment
protocols [8, 9]. While these involve somewhat different configurations of agents in space-time from the device-
independent protocols we consider here, we describe below another unconditionally secure classical relativistic bit
commitment protocol that has the same configuration of agents as our device-independent protocols. Our device-
independent quantum schemes thus cannot offer any advantage on this point. However, relativistic quantum bit
commitment protocols do have some subtler advantages in some scenarios [25, 28], which one can seek to maintain in
device-independent versions. We discuss these further below.
Device-Independent Relativistic Quantum Bit Commitment Protocols
2We begin by considering device-independent versions of the two entanglement-based relativistic bit commitment
protocols described in Ref. [28]. The protocols of Ref. [28] are unconditionally secure given the validity of quantum
mechanics and special relativity, assuming that the participating agents’ trust the functionality of their quantum
preparation and measuring devices, up to limited losses and errors. Here we describe variations whose security does
not require trusted devices. These protocols can be proven secure assuming only the cryptographic no-signalling
principle [30]:
Definition 1. No-signalling principle: Let Di (for 1 ≤ i ≤ N) be devices in separate secure laboratories at points
Pi, which accept inputs Ai and produce outputs Xi. Let J be any subset of {1 . . .N}, let J¯ be the complementary
subset, and let XJ be the random variable {Xj}j∈J . Then the conditional probability distributions for the outcomes
satisfy p(XJ |A1, . . . , AN ) = p(XJ |AJ ). 1
Since our security proofs make no assumptions about the properties of preparation or measurement devices, these
protocols offer device-independent security. Moreoever, the proofs do not assume the validity of quantum mechanics,
and therefore these protocols are also secure against adversaries who can exploit hypothetical post-quantum non-
signalling theories.
Bit commitment We employ the definitions set out in Ref. [28] for bit commitment and relativistic bit
commitment, and refer to the discussion therein for further commentary.
In the protocols we consider below, there are two unveiling agents A0 and A1, whose actions are spacelike separated
from each other and from those ofAc. The probability of a successful unveiling of bit value i depends only on the actions
of agent Ai. We will say that such a protocol provides unconditional, device-independent security against Alice if any
only if for any collective strategy S which is possible according to the no-signalling principle, p0(S)+p1(S) < 1+ ǫ(N)
and ǫ(N) → 0 as N → ∞, where N is a variable security parameter of the protocol, and p0(S) and p1(S) are the
probabilities that, by following strategy S, Alice and her agents persuade Bob that they have validly committed and
unveiled 0 or 1 respectively according to the rules of the protocol. Note that a collective strategy may be fixed by
Alice before the protocol, or Alice’s agents responsible for unveiling 0 and 1 may independently choose their strategies
after the commitment time, possibly conditioned on events in the past lightcone of their verification point but not
of the commitment point. We subsume the latter possibility under the former by allowing strategy S to include
steps in which agents make strategic choices with probabilities conditional on certain external events, with those
events themselves now explicitly included in the description of strategy S. Any strategy whereupon the conditional
probabilities for these choices are nontrivial may be written as a convex combination of deterministic strategies, so
no probabilistic strategy can have greater success probability than the most successful deterministic strategy.
We say that a relativistic protocol is unconditionally secure against Bob if, for any strategy Bob’s agents may follow
that is consistent with the no-signalling principle, if Alice’s agents choose not to unveil, then the probability of any
of Bob’s agents correctly guessing the committed bit at any point in space-time is bounded by 1/2 + ǫ′(N), where
ǫ′(N) → 0 as N → ∞. It follows from this definition, by the no-signalling principle, that when Alice does choose
to unveil, Bob cannot guess Alices commitment anywhere that does not lie in the future lightcone of the unveiling
points.
In the protocols we consider below, Alice has one committing agent, Ac, and two unveiling agents, A0 and A1, who
can unveil a valid commitment to b = 0 and 1 respectively. An additional security criterion may be required for such
protocols: that if Ac does not make a valid commitment to bit value b, Ab follows the unveiling protocol and Ab¯ does
not, then Bob’s agents, at any point in space-time, should gain no information about whether Ac committed to bit
value b¯ or declined to make a valid commitment. Our protocols also satisfy this criterion.
As usual in quantum cryptography, we initially present our protocols in an idealized form assuming perfect quantum
state preparations, transmissions, measurements and computations. However, the protocols are tolerant to noise and
errors, as we discuss later.
Space-time and communications We also make standard idealizations about the background geometry
and signalling speed. We suppose that space-time is Minkowski and that Alice and Bob each have agents in secure
laboratories infinitesimally separated from the points P , Q0 and Q1, that signals are sent at precisely light speed,
and all information processing is instantaneous. Again, these assumptions can be relaxed. The protocols remain
secure in realistic implementations with finite separations and near light speed communication. If these corrections
are small, the only significant effect is that Bob is guaranteed that Alice’s commitment is binding from some point P ′
in the near causal future of P , rather than from P itself [13]. Allowing for small deviations from Minkowski geometry
1 If both inputs and outputs take place at the same points Pi, then ensuring that these points are spacelike separated is a sufficient
condition. It is not necessary, however. The cryptographic assumption of secure laboratories implies that the devices cannot communicate
input or output information in any way through the laboratory walls, whether or not they are spacelike separated.
3also requires small corrections to the geometry when stating the security guarantees, but does not essentially affect
security beyond that [9].
Geometry Alice and Bob agree on a space-time point P and an inertial set of coordinates (x, y, z, t) for
Minkowski space with P as the origin. We focus here on the simplest case in which there are two possible unveiling
points Q0 and Q1; the protocols straightforwardly extend to versions with N unveiling points committing log(N) bits.
Alice and Bob each have agents, who during the protocol are separated in secure laboratories, adjacent to each of
the points P , Q0, Q1. To simplify we take the distances from these labs to the relevant points as negligible. Let the
agents adjacent to P be Ac and Bc, and those adjacent to Qi be Ai and Bi.
For the two protocols we describe here, the unveiling points must be spacelike separated from the commitment point.
Although it is not necessary for much of our discussion, we assume that Q0 and Q1 have positive time coordinates in
the given frame, and therefore these protocols are fixed frame positive duration (FFPD) relativistic bit commitments
in the terminology of Ref. [28].
We will also suppose that Bob has an unlimited number of additional agents which he may position at various
points between the the commitment point P and the unveiling points Q0 and Q1. However Bob needs these agents
only if he is concerned about verifying Alice’s commitment as soon as possible; if the situation is not time-sensitive
the verification steps described below could be carried out either by Bc or Bi at a slightly later time.
For definiteness we describe a protocol in which Alice and her agents exchange qubits by physical transportation
in the preparation phase. They may alternatively employ a secure quantum channel without materially altering the
security of the protocol. Note however that assuming a physically secure quantum channel requires that the physical
path of the channel lies within Alice’s secure laboratories. If one instead supposes they use quantum teleportation,
then to make a fair comparison of a fully device-independent scheme against alternatives, one would need to discuss
further the trust Alice places in her quantum teleportation devices and the encryption or other resources she may
consume.
Notation For the security proofs we employ a binary notation, denoting measurement directions X,Y by 0, 1,
measurement directions X ′, Y ′ also by 0, 1, and measurement outcomes +1,−1 also by 0, 1. A single Bell experiment
is then described by a choice of two measurement settings (x, y) ∈ {0, 1} and two measurement results (O, s) ∈ {0, 1}.
We are interested in the CHSH game score R(t ⊕ s = xy), which is the number of experiments in the set for which
the settings (x, y) and outcomes (t, s) satisfy the condition t ⊕ s = xy. In the case when the settings are random
and independent, the CHSH game score is asymptotically related to the average value of the CHSH observable
(XX ′ +XY ′ + Y X ′ − Y Y ′): for a set of N experiments, the latter expression is 4N (2R(t⊕ s = xy)−N) to leading
order in N . However, we do not assume independent random settings in all of our protocols.
CHSH 1: CHSH test protocol with fixed directions
Preparation 1. Alice and Bob agree on a set of four directions X,Y,X ′, Y ′ such that all four directions lie in a
single plane, X is orthogonal to Y , X ′ is orthogonal to Y ′, X ′ is separated from X by pi4 and Y
′ is separated from Y
by pi4 . They also agree on a bit string L
0 with bitwise complements L1.
2. Ac instructs her devices to prepare 2N Bell pairs (W
i
a,W
i
b ) in the singlet state Ψ
−, then randomly draws
an integer x ∈ {0, 1}. If x = 0 she gives the particles [W 1b , ...WNb ] to an agent A0 and the remaining particles
[WN+1b , ...W
2N
b ] to an agent A1; if x = 1 she instead gives the particles [W
N+1
b , ...,W
2N
b ] to A0 and the particles
[W 1b , ...,W
N
b ] to A1. A0 and A1 then travel to points Q0 and Q1 both at a distance d away from Ac.
We assume that Ac, A0 and A1 have secure laboratories that protect their qubits, so Bc cannot interfere with them
in any way after the initial preparation. In particular, A0 and A1 travel within secure laboratories. We also assume
that the first and second sets of states (i.e. the purported half-singlet states labelled a and b respectively) are securely
separated in sub-laboratories before Ac chooses the value of x. Thus, even if the a states are actually malicious devices
operating within the laboratory, they obtain no information about the value of x or the destinations of the b states.
Commitment At the designated commitment point P , Bc gives Ac a bit string L drawn uniformly at random from
Z
⊗N
2 . If Ac wants to commit to 0, she instructs her devices to measure each qubit W
j+xN
a ∈ [W 1+xNa , ...,WN+xNa ]
in direction (X)Lj(Y )1−Lj . If Ac wants to commit to 1 she instead instructs her devices to measure each qubit
WN+j−xN ∈ [WN+1−xNa , ...,W 2N−xNa ] in direction (X)Lj(Y )1−Lj . In either case Ac immediately broadcasts her
outcomes.
Unveiling For i ∈ {0, 1}:
At the point Qi, if agent Ai believes Alice wishes to unveil, she measures each qubit W
j+xN+iN−2ixN
a ∈
[W 1+xN+iN−2ixNa ...W
N+xN+iN−2ixN
a ] in direction (X
′)L
i
j (Y ′)1−L
i
j . She then broadcasts her measurement outcomes.
Note that in principle the agents Ac, A0 and A1 may make these decisions independently. If Alice wishes to
coordinate them and ensure that all or none unveil, she needs to give them instructions in advance. These instructions
could depend on separate events in the past light cones of their unveiling decision points, if Alice believes these events
will be correlated.
Verification Bob’s agents between P and Qi wait for the data from Ac and Ai. As soon as one agent receives both
sets of data, he calculates the CHSH game score. If the result is greater than N((2+
√
2)/4− ξ) he accepts that Alice
4made a valid commitment to bit value i. Here ξ is some predetermined small security parameter, chosen such that
ξ ≫ N−1/2; this ensures that the probability that N correctly prepared and measured singlets will fail Bob’s test is
suitably small.
Security against Alice A0, Ac and A1 announce their outcomes at spacelike separation from one another during
the protocol. They may pre-agree a collective strategy S, which may rely on shared quantum or (hypothetical) post-
quantum no-signalling resources, but cannot signal to one another during the protocol. We are interested in bounding
the probability that A0 and A1 both succeed in passing Bob’s tests for a valid commitment of 0 and 1 respectively.
Let p0(S) and p1(S) be the probabilities that when Alice employs strategy S, she and her agents convince Bob
that they have have unveiled 0 or 1 respectively according to the rules of the protocol above. Note that these
rules allow for the possibility that Bob accepts valid commitments to both 0 and 1 if both tests are passed. Let
p0(S) + p1(S) = 1 + ǫ
1
S(N).
Hence for any strategy S, ǫ1S(N) ≤
∑
L
pSL,L0
2N
where pSL,L0 is the probability that in this protocol (defined by L0),
when Alice employs strategy S and Bob chooses the bit string L, Alice and her agents produce three sets of outcomes
O,O0 and O1 such that:
d(O0 ⊕O,L0L) ≤ N(1
2
− 1
2
√
2
+ ξ) (1)
d(O1 ⊕O,L1L) ≤ N(1
2
− 1
2
√
2
+ ξ) (2)
Here d(x, y) denotes the Hamming distance between the bit strings x and y, which is the number of positions on
which the strings differ, Oi ⊕ O is the string given by element-wise modular addition of Oi and O, and LiL is the
string given by element-wise multiplication of Li and L.
These equations can be simultaneously satisfied only if d(O0 ⊕O1, L(L0 ⊕ L1)) ≤ N(1− 1√
2
+ 2ξ). Since L0 is the
bitwise complement of L1, this implies that d(O0 ⊕ O1, L) ≤ N(1− 1√
2
+ 2ξ).
Thus for given O0 ⊕O1, equations 1 and 2 may be satisfied simultaneously only if L lies within the Hamming ball
H of radius r = N(1 − 1√
2
+ 2ξ) centered on O0 ⊕ O1. For r ≤ N2 , the volume of this ball is less than or equal to
2NH(r/N) where H(x) = −x log(x) − (1− x) log(1− x) [3].
H(x) ≤ 1 with equality if and only if x = 12 , so for any ξ < 12√2 − 14 we have H(r/N) < 1.
By the no-signalling principle, the probability distribution for O0 ⊕O1 is independent of L. Thus since L is chosen
uniformly at random from Z⊗N2 , we must have ǫ
1
S(N) ≤ 2−N(1−H(r/N)), which for H(r/N) < 1 goes to zero as N goes
to infinity.
Security against Bob
Alice’s devices may perhaps have been designed by Bob in an attempt to cheat the protocol. If the devices do
something other than performing CHSH measurements on a shared quantum singlet, Ac’s outputs may give Bc
information about whether Ac measured the qubits [W
1
a ...W
N
a ] or [W
N+1
a ...W
2N
a ]. This may allow Bc to update his
prior values (which are originally equiprobable) for P (b|x), the conditional probability of the committed bit value b
given the value of Ac’s randomly chosen bit x. However, by assumption, x is random and kept secret throughout the
protocol. Before receiving unveiling data, Bob’s estimate of P (b) = 12 (P (b|0) + P (b|1)) thus remains unaltered.
Security against Bob thus relies on Alice being able to generate one unconditionally secure random bit per committed
bit, and to store this bit securely in Ac’s laboratory during the protocol.
CHSH2: CHSH protocol with secret complementary bit strings CHSH1 may straightforwardly be varied
so that Bob keeps the bit strings L0 and L1 secret from Alice until the points Q0 and Q1:
Preparation 1. Bc chooses a length N bit string L
0 drawn uniformly at randomly from Z⊗N2 . He communicates
string L0 to B0 and its bitwise complement L
1 to B1.
The remaining steps are identical to those for CHSH1.
Security against Alice: The only change in this protocol is that Alice is given less information, which can only
decrease her probability of cheating successfully. Hence the security of this protocol against Alice follows immediately
from the security of CHSH1 against Alice.
Security against Bob The proof of security against Bob is the same as for CHSH1.
CHSH3: CHSH test protocol with full randomisation
5CHSH1 may also be varied so that the measurement directions for A0 and A1 are not fixed in advance. Instead,
each Bi randomly selects a set of N measurement directions to be used by Ai, so the string L
1 is no longer guaranteed
to be the bitwise complement of L0.
The steps in this protocol are identical to those for CHSH1 except for the unveiling stage:
Unveiling For i ∈ {0, 1}:
At the point Qi, Bi gives Ai a bit string L
i drawn uniformly at randomly from Z⊗N2 . If agent Ai believes Alice
wishes to unveil, she immediately measures each qubit W j+xN+iN−2ixNa ∈ [W 1+xN+iN−2ixNa ...WN+xN+iN−2ixNa ] in
direction (X ′)L
i
j (Y ′)1−L
i
j . She then broadcasts her measurement outcomes.
Security against Alice
As before, for any strategy S, let p0(S) and p1(S) be the probabilities that when Alice employs the strategy, Alice’s
agents convince Bob that they have have validly unveiled 0 or 1 respectively according to the rules of the protocol,
and suppose p0(S) + p1(S) = 1 + ǫ
2
S(N).
By the no-signalling principle, A0’s success probability is independent of the choice of L1, and A1’s success prob-
ability is independent of the choice of L0. Hence we may calculate p0(S) and p1(S) assuming that L0 and L1 are
bitwise complements. We thus obtain the same bounds on p0(S) + p1(S) as for the first two protocols.
Security against Bob The proof of security against Bob is the same as for CHSH1.
Extensions
Declining to commit
In these relativistic bit commitment schemes, Ac decides whether or not to make a commitment. If she makes a
decision at the point P , she cannot communicate it to the Ai before they make decisions about whether or not to
unveil. Bob will learn whether or not a commitment was made and validly unveiled if he receives unveiling data.
However, Alice may perhaps not wish Bob to learn whether or not Ac chose to make a valid commitment in the cases
when the Ai choose not to unveil.
A subtle potential drawback of the protocols described above is that the security proofs do not guarantee that Bob
will be unable to tell whether or not Ac has chosen to make a commitment. If Alice’s devices actually implement
CHSH measurements on singlets, then Ac could decline to commit simply by returning a random string of N bits
to Bc. However, Bob may have designed Alice’s preparation devices. He thus may be able to distinguish between
randomly chosen bit strings and strings produced by measurements on Alice’s Bell pairs, and may therefore may be
able to detect if Ac tries this tactic to refrain from making a commitment.
However, in scenarios where these feature is problematic, our protocols can straightforwardly be altered to eliminate
it. Alice and Bob may simultaneously perform two runs of CHSH1, with the rule that Alice commits to bit value b in
both protocols if she wishes to produce a valid commitment to b, but commits to different values in each protocol if
she wishes to refrain from commitment. Bob will then accept that Alice has made a valid commitment to bit value b
only if she unveils valid commitments to bit value b for both protocols. CHSH2 or CHSH3 may similarly be duplicated
in this way.
Bob obtains no information about the values of x used in the two protocols unless Alice unveils. He thus cannot
tell whether or not she made a valid commitment if she declines to unveil.
Errors and losses
We now consider how to allow for the possibility of small errors in preparations, transmissions and measurements
of quantum states. We consider an error model which allows for errors and losses in the preparation, transmission
and measurement of singlet states. We suppose that any such errors occur randomly and independently, and that
the combined rate of errors and losses is bounded by a parameter δ, which we assume is small. In this model, the
expectation values of the distances d(Oi ⊕ O,LiL) are altered by no more than δN , with variance no larger than
δ1/2N1/2.
Bob’s verification tests involve a security parameter ξ, and the security proof for CHSH1 holds for
ξ <
1
2
√
2
− 1
4
. (3)
In particular, if δ is agreed to be the maximum tolerable rate of errors and losses, and δ is small, Bob can use a value
ξ > δ in his verification tests, consistent with (3), and still ensure security against Alice.
The security proofs of CHSH2 and CHSH3 do not depend on additional assumptions about errors and losses, and
so similarly remain secure for small δ. Thus we can ensure that both protocols are secure against Alice provided the
expected rate of errors and losses is small.
The proofs of security against Bob do not depend on any assumptions about errors or losses, and therefore no
alteration is required for these proofs.
6Discussion
Device memory attacks
A quite general concern in device-independent quantum cryptography is that maliciously designed devices may
keep records of their inputs and outputs and may make their future outputs depend on these data [40]. Our protocols
are secure against these attacks for a single bit commitment. However, if Alice reuses her devices for a sequence of
commitments, our protocols do not protect her from the possibility that data released (for example to Bc) in a later
commitment may give information about earlier commitments. This is not a concern if all her commitments are in
any case later unveiled, so long as the devices are not reused until points in the causal future of points at which Bob
can receive both the commitment and unveiling data. Similarly, it would not be a concern if her commitment data
loses any value in the causal future of certain spacetime points (call them expiration points), whether or not it was
unveiled, so long as the devices are not reused until points in the causal future of an expiration point. However,
in many common scenarios, some commitment data is unveiled and some should be kept secret indefinitely. Our
protocols do not guarantee security for device reuse against completely general attacks in such scenarios.
However, our protocols do guarantee security for device reuse against memory attacks, so long as the devices are
not also able to carry out location attacks, and so long as the Ai’s decision whether to unveil is coordinated. The
reason is that, if neither A0 and A1 accept any device input or supply any output unless the bit is to be unveiled,
and if the devices are not sensitive to their location, then the devices can carry no information correlated with x (and
hence nor with b) after a protocol without unveiling. They thus have no ability to leak information about b in future
protocols.
Other security assumptions
As with the protocols of Refs. [9, 13, 22], the present protocols can be chained together in sequence, allowing longer
term bit commitments and flexibility in the relation between the commitment and unveiling sites (in particular, they
need not be lightlike separated). Full security and efficiency analyses for these chained protocols remain tasks for
future work.
We note that the unconditional, device-independent security of both protocols depend on the assumption that Bob
has access to a device independent method of generating random numbers which is secure in the sense that Alice
cannot predict its output in advance. There exists no device independent method of generating random numbers with
no random seed, but there do exist device independent methods of randomness expansion [41–43, 45], which can create
a long random string from some small random seed. Since the random seed used in these protocols can be of a low
quality of randomness (i.e. the expansion still works if the ‘random’ input is partially correlated with variables which
may be known to the adversarial party [47]), it could be obtained by some classical quasi-random process which Alice
is unlikely to be able to predict or control perfectly, such as a coin flip. Therefore device-independent randomness
expansion suffices for effectively device-independent security of these protocols.
The CHSH2 protocol requires Bob to generate 2N random strings and the CHSH3 protocol requires him to generate
3N random strings, in contrast with only one string in CHSH1. However there may be contexts in which CHSH2
and CHSH3 are preferred - for example, if Bob wishes to control the time of Alice’s measurements, which might
be particularly important for chained protocols. In the CHSH1 protocol, Alice may make the measurements whose
results she unveils at Q0 and Q1 at any time, even before the start of the protocol, but in CHSH2 and CHSH3 she
must wait until Bob tells her which measurement directions to use. In such contexts CHSH3 offers greater security
to Bob, because in CHSH2, L1 must be the bitwise complement of L0 and therefore it follows from the no-signalling
principle that B0 and B1 must agree on these strings at some time in the causal past of P . This is a potential security
weakness, since if Alice can find out the strings L0 and L1 in advance of the commitment, then A0 and A1 can perform
their measurements earlier than Bob expects.
Note that, like all technologically unconstrained quantum bit commitment protocols[20, 21], our protocols do not
prevent Alice from committing to a quantum superposition of bits. She can simply input a superposition α |0〉+ β |1〉
into a quantum computer programmed to implement the two relevant quantum measurement interactions for inputs
|0〉 and |1〉 and to send two copies of the quantum outcome data towards Q0 and Q1, and keep all the data at
the quantum level until (if) she chooses to unveil. This gives her no advantage in stand-alone applications of bit
commitment, for example for making a secret prediction: it does, however, mean that one cannot assume that in
a task involving bit commitment subprotocols, any unopened bit commitments necessarily had definite classical bit
values, even if all unveiled bit commitments produced valid classical unveilings.
In comparing relativistic bit commitment protocols, one needs to consider the configuration of agents in space-
time as well as the resources required. To make a precise comparison, we first describe a classical relativistic bit
commitment protocol with the same configuration of agents as the schemes above.
Random code classical bit commitment protocol (RCCBC)
Preparation 1. Alice and Bob agree on a security parameter N ; for simplicity we take N to be even.
2. Ac generates two independent N -bit random classical strings, S
0 and S1, and securely shares string Si with
7agent Ai.
Commitment At the designated commitment point P , Bc gives Ac a randomly chosen size N/2 subset J of
{1, . . . , N}. Ac immediately responds by giving Bc the string subset {Sij : i = 0, 1 ; j ∈ J}. These string ele-
ments are sent with their labels i and j. To commit to bit value i, Ac also sends the complementary string subset
Si
J¯
= {Sij : j ∈ J¯}. These string elements are sent with their labels j, but not i. Hence Bc refers to this string as SJ¯ ,
with i unknown to him.
Unveiling For i ∈ {0, 1}:
At the point Qi, if agent Ai believes Alice wishes to unveil, she gives Bi the complete string S
i.
Verification On receiving the two substrings S0J and S
1
J , Bc checks that their Hamming distance satisfies
|d(S0J , S1J) − N/4| < CN3/4, where C > 0 is an agreed parameter independent of N . If not, he immediately re-
jects the commitment. Otherwise, Bob’s agents between P and Qi wait for the data from Ac and Ai. As soon as an
agent receives data from Bi and Bc, he checks whether the string S
i reported by Bi is the union of the strings S
i
J and
SJ¯ reported by Bc, with matching labels for each element. If it is, he accepts that Alice made a valid commitment to
bit value i.
Security against Alice A0, Ac and A1 announce their outcomes at spacelike separation from one another during
the protocol. They may pre-agree a collective strategy S, which may rely on shared quantum or (hypothetical) post-
quantum no-signalling resources, but cannot signal to one another during the protocol. We are interested in bounding
the probability that A0 and A1 both succeed in passing Bob’s tests for a valid commitment of 0 and 1 respectively.
Let p0(S) and p1(S) be the probabilities that when Alice employs strategy S, she and her agents convince Bob
that they have have unveiled 0 or 1 respectively according to the rules of the protocol above. Note that these
rules allow for the possibility that Bob accepts valid commitments to both 0 and 1 if both tests are passed. Let
p0(S) + p1(S) = 1 + ǫ
3
S(N).
Hence for any strategy S, ǫ3S(N) ≤
∑
L
pSJ
2N where p
S
J is the probability that when Alice employs strategy S and
Bob chooses the subset J , Alice’s agents produce strings S0 and S1 such that |d(S0J , S1J ) − N/4| < CN3/4 and also
that S0j = S
1
j = Sj for j ∈ J¯ .
If Alice’s agents succeed in producing strings with these properties, they can infer that the complement J¯ of Bc’s
chosen subset J lies within a subset of size no more than 3N/4+CN3/4 of {1, . . . , N}. By the no-signalling principle,
it follows that ǫ3S(N)→ 0 as N →∞.
Security against Bob
Alice’s strings are randomly generated. Bob thus receives no information correlated with the bit value i unless and
until at least one of the Ai unveils.
Note that this security argument relies on Alice being able to generate 2N unconditionally secure classical random
bits per committed bit, to share these bits between Ac and the Ai before the protocol, and to keep them securely in
the agents’ laboratories before and during the protocol.
Comparison of Classical and Device-Independent Quantum Relativistic Bit Commitment Protocols
Security The classical and device-independent quantum relativistic bit commitment protocols described above all
have the same configuration of agents for the two parties, and are all unconditionally secure. While the quantum
protocols do not require either party to trust the quantum devices used, they still require both parties to have trusted
classical computing and memory devices. They thus have no advantage over the classical protocol in this respect.
Use of Classical Randomness: Bob: The classical protocols and the CHSH1 quantum protocol both require
Bc to be able to generate a random string that Alice cannot predict in advance. These strings may be generated at
P , and immediately handed over to Ac, so they do not need to be kept secure; nor do they need to be distributed
securely to Bob’s other agents.
The CHSH2 protocol also requires a second random string to be generated and securely distributed and stored by
B0 and B1. The CHSH3 protocols instead requires B0 and B1 to generate random independent strings that Alice
cannot predict in advance. These strings may be generated at the points Qi, and immediately handed over to Alice’s
agents Ai, so they do not need to be kept secure; nor do they need to be distributed securely to Bob’s other agents.
Use of Classical Randomness: Alice: The classical protocol requires Alice to generate twoN -bit random strings,
to share them securely between Ac and A0 or A1, and to store them securely in the various agents’ laboratories. In
contrast, the CHSH protocols each require Ac to generate and keep secure a single random classical bit. If the devices
are distinguishable, this bit is also shared and stored securely in A0 and A1’s laboratories, since the set of physical
devices (purported stored qubits) given to these agents depends on the bit value.
In addition, the CHSH protocols require Ac to share devices (purportedly containing sets of qubits) with A0 and
A1, and these devices must also be stored securely in the respective laboratories. If Bob can access all the devices, he
can gain information about the committed bit.
This adds nuance to the comparison. If the devices do indeed contain sets of qubits, and each qubit is indeed
maximally entangled with a another qubit in another appropriately located device, and the devices do indeed faithfully
8carry out projective CHSH measurements on these qubits, Alice could use them to generate classical random strings
shared between Ac and each of the Ai, and these shared strings could be used to implement the classical protocol
RCCBC. However, since the devices are untrusted, Alice cannot naively implement such a strategy. Moreover,
although it may be harder to keep entangled quantum states secure than to keep shared random classical strings
secure, the former offers a potentially valuable security advantage. Imagine a scenario in which Alice has a large
network of agents who carry out commitments, generally relying on untrusted quantum devices. For example, Alice
may be technologically disadvantaged, and so must generally rely on externally supplied devices, which may have been
produced by Bob. However, suppose that, at some extra cost, Alice is able, without prior announcement, to introduce
trusted quantum devices to verify some of the purported singlets used by her agents. She can then get information
about the extent of any potential security breaches. If her agents are using the classical protocol, on the other hand,
there is no reliable way for her to verify the privacy of the shared classical random strings she uses. If Bob is able
to breach her security, he can gain information about the strings (and hence her bit commitments) without altering
them or leaving any other physical trace.
Summary Both our device-independent CHSH quantum relativistic bit commitment protocols and their classical
counterpart are unconditionally secure. However, the device-independent protocols appear to have some subtle but
real advantages that are potentially valuable in some scenarios. We thus take our discussion as offering an argument
for the practical value of device-independent quantum cryptography in relativistic bit commitment, and stronger
arguments for its value in more general relativistic cryptographic scenarios. We should, though, underline that we
have compared specific device-independent protocols against a specific classical protocol. It remains an open task to
identify the optimal protocols of each type (for any of the various natural measures of optimality) and compare them.
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